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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Pro se appellant Joseph Elliott Porter appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 The District Court’s February 23, 2021 memorandum recounts the background of 
Porter’s litigation against AHP Settlement Trust (“the Trust”), which was established 
under the Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement 
Agreement”) to compensate class members who suffered valvular heart disease from 
using certain diet drugs.  Because the parties are familiar with the underlying 
background, we will not discuss it at length.  The Settlement Agreement provides for 
eligible claimants to receive compensation under matrices “A” and “B,” depending on 
certain qualifying factors.  In 2015, class member Miguel A. Larrieu submitted his claim 
for Matrix A-1 benefits, with supporting medical documentation.  The Trust reviewed his 
claim and classified him as eligible for reduced compensation under Matrix B-1.  Larrieu 
contested the determination, but ultimately, on June 8, 2018, the District Court entered a 
memorandum and order holding that Larrieu was entitled to compensation under Matrix 
B-1.  See In re: Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 99-cv-20593 
(Documents #5327 and #5328).  Larrieu did not appeal.  Meanwhile, Porter pursued a 
supplemental claim determination on Larrieu’s behalf, but that claim was discontinued by 
the parties’ stipulation.  See id. (Document #9510). 
 On May 7, 2020, Porter filed this complaint in the District of South Carolina, 
referencing Larrieu’s claims registered with the Trust “that have already been processed 
and thus adjudicated.”  (Complaint, Supporting Document at 1.)  Although not an 




agreement, that the agreement specified a percentage that Porter would receive from 
Larrieu’s claim settlement, and that Larrieu’s claim had been calculated incorrectly under 
Matrix B instead of Matrix A.  Porter sought damages, noting a power of attorney amount 
and a Matrix A claim amount.  The District Court for the District of South Carolina 
transferred the complaint to the District Court, noting that Porter earlier had filed a nearly 
identical complaint, also transferred, which had been dismissed for failure to effect 
proper service under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 Porter similarly failed to serve this second complaint as required under Rule 4(m).  
He requested but did not obtain the Trust’s waiver of service.  The District Court ordered 
Porter to serve the complaint, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal.  
Porter filed an affidavit indicating that the summons and complaint were served on 
January 14, 2021, by hand delivery to a staff member at the office of the Trust’s counsel.  
The Trust filed a motion to dismiss, acknowledging the hand-delivered complaint to 
counsel’s law firm but asserting that counsel was not authorized to accept service for the 
Trust.  Alternatively, the Trust argued that Porter failed to state a cognizable claim for 
relief.  The parties briefed the issues. 
 The District Court analyzed the Trust’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(5) 
and 12(b)(6).  The District Court rejected Porter’s suggestion that a Google search 
showing that the Trust’s office was closed excused proper service under Rule 4(m).  
Further noting that Porter neither disputed that the Trust’s counsel was not authorized to 
accept service nor attempted to show otherwise, and that Porter still had not served the 




insufficient process.  Moreover, the District Court determined that, even if service were 
deemed to be sufficient, the Trust would be entitled to dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  First, citing Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group., Inc., 584 F.3d 
169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009), the District Court found that Porter’s attempt to contest the 
calculation of Larrieu’s claim is barred by res judicata.  Second, the District Court found 
that, although the Settlement Agreement allows for contingency fee payments to 
attorneys for successful class members, the Settlement Agreement does not provide for 
payment of fees to non-attorneys, such as Porter, for helping a class member submit a 
claim.  Accordingly, the District Court entered an order dismissing the complaint.1  This 
appeal followed, and we exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
parties have submitted arguments to support their positions on appeal. 
 Porter argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his case for insufficient 
service, noting that the proper service on the Trust is evidenced by the Trust’s counsel’s 
ability to file documents in response to the complaint.  In addition, pointing to the District 
Court’s order language specifying that it granted the Trust’s motion to dismiss “for 
insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5),” Porter contends that the service issue 
is the sole basis for the District Court’s dismissal, and disregards the District Court’s 
reliance on the “reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum” in its dismissal order.  
Indeed, Porter argues that we should reinstate his complaint by transferring it back to the 
District of South Carolina. 
 
1 The District Court did not reach Porter’s pending motion for default judgment in light 




 However, we may affirm the District Court’s decision on any basis supported by 
the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  Upon 
review of the record and the parties’ submissions on appeal, we will affirm here.  Porter 
does not address the District Court’s alternative reasons supporting dismissal of his 
complaint, but for substantially similar reasons given by the District Court, we agree that 
dismissal was appropriate.  As noted above, the District Court considered Porter’s claims 
even assuming proper service of the complaint, and Porter conceded that Larrieu’s claims 
already had been adjudicated pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.  Even if he is 
entitled to a portion of Larrieu’s claim amount by operation of his power of attorney 
agreement, Porter has not shown that the Trust is obligated under the Settlement 
Agreement to disburse any funds to him directly. 
 Because no substantial question is presented here, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order dismissing Porter’s complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
